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SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITIES
Purpose of the supervisory function
The objectives of prudential supervision in theUnited Kingdom include (i) the fostering ofconfidence in the financial markets in the United
Kingdom, (ii) the promotion of public awareness of the
risks and benefits involved in investment and financial
dealings, (iii) the protection of consumers of financial
services and (iv) the reduction of financial crime – see
sections 2–6, Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. If
the Financial Services Authority fails in meeting any of
these very general requirements, can it be made liable in
damages to disappointed depositors or investors?
Liability on tortious basis
On general principles, the regulator could in theory incur
tortious liability in negligence to a depositor/investor who
suffers loss as a result of placing funds with a supervised
entity. The claimant would however have to establish that
there exists (i) a duty of care owed by the regulator to a
specific person or class of persons (including the claimant),
(ii) a breach of that duty and (iii) actual loss suffered by the
claimant as a result of that breach of duty.
Alternatively, the claimant might seek to establish the
tort of breach of statutory duty. He would have to
demonstrate that (i) there was a statutory duty to supervise
the institution, (ii) the duty was imposed for the benefit of
an identifiable class of persons, (iii) the claimant is a member
of that class and (iv) there has been a breach of the duty.
Defences for the regulator
The courts recognise the governmental character of the
supervisory process, that regulators have to balance
competing interests (eg in deciding whether to revoke a
licence) and that they should be able to perform their
functions without undue fear of legal proceedings. As a
result, the courts have held that depositors/investors
cannot sue the regulator for losses resulting from a breach
of statutory duty – Davis v Radcliffe [1990] 1 WLR 82I (PC).
Likewise, depositors/investors cannot sue the regulator for
losses flowing from the negligent licensing or supervision
of a regulated entity, or the failure to withdraw a licence at
an appropriate time – Yuen Kun-Yeu v Attorney General of
Hong Kong [1988] AC 175 (PC).
The mere fact that a public authority acts beyond the
scope of its powers does not of itself create a liability in
tort/damages. There must be a statutory duty of care
imposed for the benefit of a specific and limited group of
people which includes the claimant – X(Minors) v
Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633. The regulator
usually benefits from statutory protections or immunities –
eg the FSA is immune from actions arising out of the
performance of their official functions, unless they are
shown to have acted in bad faith or certain Human Rights
Act considerations apply – see Schedule 1, Financial
Services and Markets Act 2000.
Furthermore, in some jurisdictions, it has been
explicitly recognised that a regulator owes his duties to the
public as a whole, and not to individual investors. In the
absence of a specific and targeted duty of care, the
regulator cannot be liable for the loss of deposits in this
type of case – see above. It follows from the points noted
above that a regulator will not generally incur legal liability
to depositors/investors for “mere” negligence in carrying
out its licensing/supervisory functions. The regulator does
not owe a duty of care to individual depositors or investors;
alternatively, it enjoys a statutory immunity from suit. But
this does not completely exclude the possibility of a
successful legal action.
Misfeasance in public office
It will be noted that the statutory immunity provisions
are not absolute – they can be overridden if the regulator
has acted in bad faith: The rationale for the tort of
“misfeasance in public office” lies in the requirement that
public officers must exercise their executive powers for the
public good, and not for some ulterior or improper
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purpose, whether or not involving a personal benefit to the
officer concerned: Jones v Swansea City Council [1990] 1
WLR 54. In a society based upon the rule of law, public
officials cannot be exonerated from legal liability if they
exercise their powers improperly or capriciously.
The claimant must prove that:
• The defendant is a public officer;
• The acts of which complaint is made must involve the
exercise of a public or official power – Cornelius v
Hackney London Borough Council, The Times, 27
August 2002;
• The regulator acted in bad faith – ie it knew that it was
acting outside the scope of its powers in the knowledge
that this was likely to cause damage to depositors/
investors. The courts have tested this principle in
relation to a veterinary inspector – Northern Territory
v Mengel (1995) 69 AJLR 527; in relation to a police
force – Garrett v Attorney General [1997] 2 NZLR
332; and in relation to the discharge of judicial
functions by judges – Rawlinson v Rice [1997] 2 NZLR
651 and Harvey v Derrick [1995] 1 NZLR 314;
• The regulator owes a duty of care to the
depositor/investor (this will not usually pose much
difficulty because any individual has a right not to be
damaged/injured by a deliberate abuse or reckless of
power by a public officer);
• There is a (factual) causal link between the regulator’s
alleged breach of duty and the loss suffered by the
claimant; and
• The losses in respect of which the claim is made must
not be too remote (ie the public officer knew that his
actions would be likely to give rise to the losses in
question).
It will be seen that these requirements are fairly
stringent. Ultimately, this is a classic situation in which the
law seeks to balance competing interests. On the one hand,
public officers must be accountable for their actions. But
on the other hand, public officers must be allowed to carry
out the functions for which they have been appointed, and
they must accordingly be protected from legal actions
which lack merit. It thus becomes necessary to consider
how the courts have managed this balancing exercise in the
decided cases.
THE COURTS AND THE REGULATORS
Background and four leading cases
The foregoing section has considered the theoretical
basis for possible legal actions against financial regulators.
The present section considers the practical outcome of
some of the main litigation which has occurred in this area
(although the choice of cases is necessarily selective). It is
proposed to consider four leading cases in this area, in
chronological order.
Yuen Kun-Yeu v AG of Hong Kong (1988)
The Hong Kong Commissioner of Deposit–taking
Companies granted to the American and Panama Finance
Co Ltd, a licence to accept deposits under the Deposit-
taking Companies Ordinance. The Ordinance was
specifically made in order “…to regulate the taking of
money on deposit and to make provision for the protection
of persons who deposit money, and for the regulation of
deposit-taking business for monetary policy purposes….”
The claimants deposited moneys with the company
before its licence was revoked, and lost most of that money
when it subsequently went into liquidation. They sued the
Hong Kong regulator for their losses, on the basis that he
knew (or, with reasonable care, would have known) that
the company was speculating with the depositors’ money
and/or was acting fraudulently. The depositors’ claim
failed, on the basis that the Commissioner owed to them
no specific duty of care in exercising his statutory powers.
In deciding how to exercise those powers, the
Commissioner had to take into account a number of
factors, including the possibility of improving the financial
position of the licensed entity and the need to maintain
confidence in the financial markets. The Commissioner’s
duties were owed accordingly to the public at large – not
to individual depositors.
The granting of a licence did not amount to an official
“seal of approval” and thus could not form the basis of a
claim by the depositors. The issue of the licence did not
create a government-backed warranty to the effect that all
deposit-taking companies were sound and creditworthy.
The claim against the Commissioner was accordingly
bound to fail, and was struck out.
Davis v Radcliffe (1990)
This case arose out of the collapse of Savings and
Investment Bank Ltd in 1982. SIBL was licensed to accept
deposits by the Treasurer and the Finance Board, Isle of
Man. Disappointed depositors sued the regulators, on the
basis that they owed a duty adequately to supervise the
business of SIBL.
Once again, the court found that the functions of the
regulator were to be exercised in the general public
interest, and no separate or specific duty of care was owed
to the depositors as a class. Furthermore, the depositors
were seeking to render the regulator liable for losses
flowing from the default of a third party. The court would
generally be reluctant to impose such an extensive duty of
care – especially where the regulator had only secondary
control over the conduct of SIBL’s business.
As a result, the depositors’ claim had to fail, and it was
struck out without a full hearing.
Hall v Bank of England (2000)
This was a slightly different type of case, in that the
claimant was the controlling shareholder (rather than a24
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depositor) in the licensed entity. Bradford Investments plc
was established by four members of the Hall family.
Bradford took deposits from the public and was licensed
for that purpose by the Bank of England. The proceeds
were used to invest in cheap housing in the North of
England, which was then let to tenants.
The Bank of England subsequently became unhappy
with the management of Bradford, and imposed various
restrictions on its business. New managers (acceptable to
the Bank of England) were appointed and they were
required to dispose of unoccupied properties as soon as
possible. The relationship between the Hall family and the
new management deteriorated. The Halls claimed that the
policy for disposal of properties was disastrous, and was
causing substantial losses to the Halls as shareholders. The
Halls thereupon sued the Bank of England, on the bases
that (i) it could have intervened in the disposal process and
(ii) its failure to do so amounted to misfeasance in public
office.
The Court of Appeal noted that “misfeasance in public
office” involved proof of a deliberate and dishonest
decision by the Bank not to exercise its statutory powers.
Since there was no evidence of dishonesty, the claim was
again struck out without a full hearing on the merits.
Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England (2000/2001)
These proceedings were instituted by depositors in
BCCI, and the general background to the collapse of that
institution is well known. Part of the depositors’ claim
rested on the alleged failure of the United Kingdom
properly to transpose into domestic law the provisions of
the (EC) First Banking Directive, and the Community
requirement for a remedy in such case. This was an
attractive approach for the depositors for it would relieve
them of the barriers erected by the “bad faith”
requirement. The House of Lords rejected this argument
and (on the basis that the matter was “acte clair”) refused
to refer the question to the European Court of Justice.
It is believed that the House of Lords conclusion on the
substantive point is probably correct, but the refusal to
make a reference is perhaps unfortunate because: (a) the
German Supreme Court has recently decided to refer
precisely the same questions; and (b) the point is perhaps
less clear than the House of Lords has suggested – see, for
example, Andenas and Fairgrieve, Misfeasance in Public Office,
Governmental Liability and European Influences, ICLQ October
2002, 757.
Liability for failure to implement the First Banking
Directive could arise if (i) the result prescribed by the
Directive entails the grant of rights to individuals, (ii) it is
possible to identify the content of those rights on the basis
of the Directive and (iii) there is a causal link between the
failure to implement the Directive and the Loss suffered by
the claimants: Francovich v Italy [1993] 2 CMLR 66. The
first and second conditions to State liability were not met
in this case. The First Banking Directive was merely a “first
step” towards the mutual recognition of authorisations of
credit institutions; full recognition was only achieved under
the Second Banking Directive: Parodi case [1997] ECR I-
3899.
Furthermore, the First Banking Directive referred to the
protection of consumers, but only in a general way. It did
not provide standards of supervision or provide
benchmarks against which the conduct of the regulator
could be judged. A general desire that consumers should be
protected falls short of any sufficient indication of the
rights to be conferred upon them. For these reasons, it is
suggested that the House of Lords decision was correct on
this point, although a reference to the European Court
might have been desirable. It should be added that the
conclusion of the House of Lords in this area in no sense
prevents the EC Commission from taking proceedings
against the United Kingdom if it believes that the Directive
has not been implemented adequately in the UK. The
Commission is in the process of instituting proceedings
against the UK in relation to its implementation of the
Insurance Directives and its supervision of Lloyds – see
“Ministers face EU Action over Lloyds”, (Times, 20 January
2003).
Having disposed of the issues based upon the First
Banking Directive, it was necessary to consider whether
the depositor’s claim could proceed on other grounds. The
depositors could not sue the Bank of England in “mere”
negligence, because it enjoys the statutory protection
contained in section 1(4), Banking Act 1987 – it could
incur no liability unless bad faith could be proved.
Consequently, they had to rely on the tort of “misfeasance
in public office”, the ingredients of which have been noted
earlier.
It might be thought that the BCCI litigation was in many
respects similar to the Hong Kong/Isle of Man litigation
noted above. And yet – in sharp contrast to the earlier
cases – the House of Lords (admittedly only by a 3-2
majority) allowed the claim to proceed to a full trial. Why
was this the case? Although the decision is complex, it is
suggested that it is motivated by three, key factors.
First of all, it was argued that the Bank of England acted
unlawfully in granting a licence to BCCI in the first
instance. In particular, it relied on the assessment of BCCI
by the Luxembourg regulator. The Bank of England was
entitled to do this provided that (i) it was satisfied with the
nature and scope of the Luxembourg regulatory system
and (ii) BCCI’s principal place of business was in
Luxembourg – section 9(3), Banking Act 1987. The
difficulty was that BCCI was incorporated in Luxembourg
but its principal place of business appears to have been in the
United Kingdom. If that is so, then the Bank of England
was not entitled to rely upon the Luxembourg assessment
in issuing the licence. This is not of itself sufficient to
enable the depositors to win their case – they would still 25
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have to prove bad faith and other elements of the
misfeasance tort – but this factor nevertheless distinguishes
the BCCI litigation from the previous cases.
Secondly, the Bank of England did not revoke the BCCI
licence in 1990/1 even though (according to the
depositors) it was by that time clear that BCCI was
managed fraudulently and was insolvent. The Bank of
England maintains that a rescue operation remained
possible during this period, and that it was justified in
allowing BCCI to continue business until it became clear
that the rescue could not materialise. Again, this particular
feature distinguishes the BCCI litigation from previous
cases.
Thirdly, the House of Lords expressed concerns about
the use which had been made of the Bingham Report.
Whilst this had been prepared in a thorough and detailed
manner, it was not intended for use in proceedings of this
kind and its conclusions had obviously been reached
without submissions on the part of the depositors.
The BCCI case has continued to the inspection of
documents stage. It has been alleged that internal
memoranda discuss the use of BCCI as a conduit for the
money laundering activities of the then Panamanian
President, Manuel Noriega. The depositors now allege that
the regulators refrained from closing down BCCI on the
grounds that this would upset Gulf rulers with interests in
the bank, and that BCCI was allowed to continue trading
for a period of three years after this information came to
light – see the report in the Sunday Times, 25 August,
2002. Similar allegations were considered in the Bingham
Report itself.
It is difficult to comment in further detail, given that the
trial of the substantive issues has only just begun.
Nevertheless, a few general points may be noted:
• The fact that BCCI may have been engaged in money
laundering does not necessarily lead to the conclusion
that it should have been closed immediately;
• Although the point is not entirely beyond argument, a
failure to exercise a discretion to act will not normally
amount to “misfeasance” on the part of the regulator; and
• Even if depositors can establish a misfeasance claim and
show that the Bank of England should have revoked
BCCI’s licence at an earlier stage, their damages would
have to be calculated to represent the difference
between (i) the amount which the depositors would
have recovered if the regulator had acted at the
appropriate time and (ii) the amount which they
actually recovered in the liquidation. This will involve
some very difficult factual and accounting evidence.
Overview of the cases
What lessons can be drawn from these decisions? Whilst
the BCCI case has inevitably caused some concern in
regulatory circles, it is to be regarded as exceptional. In
most other cases, the regulator has succeeded in striking
out the claim, without detailed examination of the merits.
In general terms, it is suggested that the courts will
continue to strike out claims of this nature. The BCCI
litigation is unlikely to form a model for future judicial
decisions in this area.
OTHER JURISDICTIONS
United States
The government of the United States and its agencies
are generally immune from the jurisdiction of the domestic
courts, save where such sovereignty has been explicitly
waived (Hercules Inc v United States) 516 US 417, 1996.
Such an express waiver has been given in relation to actions
in tort – Federal Tort Claims Act.
But there is one exemption from the waiver which is
important in the present context – the so called
“discretionary function” exemption. The result is that the
Government is not liable in tort where (i) the relevant
governmental action involved a genuine choice or
discretionary element; and (ii) the decision was essentially
a matter of policy. Decisions concerning the licensing of
financial institutions would generally constitute
discretionary functions, with the result that disappointed
depositors would be unable to pursue the regulatory at
law.Likewise, the Tucker Act (28 USC s1491 (a)) includes
a waiver in respect of claims against the United States
under any contract (express or implied).
This led to difficulties for the US Government in
connection with the savings and loans industry. Healthier
thrifts were persuaded to take over weaker ones, on the
basis of a contractual assurance from a government agency
that they could account for “qualifying supervisory
goodwill”. This was essential for, otherwise, the acquiring
thrifts would have been rendered insolvent. The
Government subsequently introduced legislation to reverse
this accounting treatment. Since the introduction of the
new rules was in breach of the contracts made with the
thrifts, those institutions could thus recover damages
against the Government (United States v Winstar Corp 518 US
839, 1996).
Canada
The Canadian Supreme Court has recently considered
the extent of a regulator’s liability for a failed institution
(Cooper v Hobart, 2001, SCC 79). The claim in that case was
phrased in “pure” negligence – no attempt was made to
plead the “misfeasance in public office” tort. The court
held that two tests had to be satisfied namely (i) a
foreseeability test; and (ii) a proximity text.
As to the first test, it was plainly foreseeable that (in the
event of negligent supervision) depositors might lose their
money. However, the depositors were unable to satisfy the26
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second, proximity test, because there was no “close and
direct” relationship between the regulator and the
depositors. The regulator’s duties were owed to the public
as a whole, with a view to providing a general framework
for an orderly market. This was inconsistent with the
existence of a separate, private law duty to the depositors.
There were other considerations which negated the
existence of a duty of care. In particular, the regulator was
invested with broad discretionary functions which involved
the formulation of executive policy. The Government
cannot be found negligent in this field because a court is
not entitled to substitute its own decision on policy issues.
Equally, the imposition of a duty of care would (so far as
the regulator is concerned) involve an indeterminate
liability to an indeterminate number of investors. Thus,
even had a duty of care arisen, the court would have
negated it on policy grounds.
The depositor’s claim accordingly failed.
Other common law jurisdictions
Hong Kong
The decision in Yuen Kun-Yeu v AG for Hong Kong has
already been noted. Although a Privy Council decision, the
case originated in Hong Kong and the decision of the Hong
Kong Court of Appeal was substantially affirmed. A second
case was heard in Hong Kong in 1991, arising from the
governmental decision to close down BCCI (HK). A
depositor applied for judicial review of the decision to
close down the bank. The main ground was that the
government had previously rescued Hang Lung Bank and
thus created a “legitimate expectation” that institutions
would be rescued. This argument failed because the
Financial Secretary had made it clear at that time that bank
rescues would be on a “case by case” basis, and some
institutions might be allowed to collapse.
Australia
Banking supervision is in the hands of the Australian
Prudential Regulation Authority. Under the relevant
legislation, no legal action can be taken against the
regulator “ …. in respect of anything done or omitted to
be done in good faith and without negligence in connection
with the exercise of powers or the performance of
functions …” under the applicable legislation (section 70A
of the Banking Act 1959, as amended);
It is not immediately clear how far this helps the
regulator. If it has acted in good faith and without
negligence, then it would not be liable in any event,
regardless of the section. However, if the Australian courts
follow the Canadian decision in Cooper v Hobart the point
will not arise because the regulator will not be found to
owe a duty of care to depositors. It should be noted that
the liquidator of the HIH Group has started proceedings
against APRA in respect of its supervision of HIH –
Canberra Times, 18 November 2002.
New Zealand
Under Section 146 of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand
Act, the regulator is entitled to immunity so long as it has
acted “ …. in good faith and without negligence …”.
Once again, and for the reasons given earlier, it is not
obvious how this protects the regulator. The New Zealand
courts have held that there may be policy reasons for
negating any duty of care which a market regulator might
otherwise owe to individual market participants (Oceania
Aviation Limited v Director of Civil Aviation (February 2001)).
More directly relevant is the decision in a case involving
the Securities Commission, which was charged with the
supervision of newspaper advertisements relating to
securities. The court rejected the notion that these public or
statutory functions were capable of creating a private law
duty of care. In addition, the relevant legislation contained
an immunity for the regulator, provided that it had acted
with reasonable care (Fleming v Securities Commission [1995]
2 NZLR 514).
France
A case decided in 1996 suggested that the Commission
Bancaire could be liable for “mere” negligence (faute simple)
in the supervision of a financial institution – see the El
Shikh case (Cour administrative d’appel, Paris, 30 March
1999), which arose out of the BCCI collapse. A similar
result had been reached in relation to the supervision of an
insurance undertaking (Proceedings by Groupe Dentressangle,
13 July 1999).
However, in the Kechichian case (30 November 2001)
the Conseil d’Etat decided that the regulator could only be
made liable on the basis of serious negligence (faute lourde)
in the context of the regulation of the financial sector. In
that case, the Commission Bancaire had failed to insist on
recapitalisation plans which had previously been agreed,
and the Bank became insolvent. The regulator had been
guilty of faute lourde, but fraud within the bank was the
main causative factor. The regular’s liability was therefore
limited to 10 per cent of the losses.
INTERNATIONAL ISSUES
Key problems
The issue here is one of diverse customer bases and the
number of jurisdictions involved. Depositors might seek
recourse in other jurisdictions; for example, a depositor in
another EC Member State might seek to sue the FSA
before the courts of that Member State, on the basis that it
was primarily responsible for the supervision of the
insolvent institution concerned. The principle of “home
state” (rather than “host state”) supervision operates in a
European Community context.
There are potential difficulties involved in defending a
diversity of suits brought in different jurisdictions with
different liability tests, including issues of jurisdiction and
state immunity. 27
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Jurisdiction
Under the Brussels and Lugano Conventions on
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and
commercial matters, courts sitting within the Convention
countries may assume jurisdiction over proceedings
involving “…civil and commercial matters….” An action
against a public authority acting in the discharge of a public
junction is not a “civil or commercial matter” for these
purposes – Netherlands State v Rüffer, Case 814/79 [1980]
ECR 3807. Consequently, courts within Convention States
cannot claim jurisdiction over a central bank regulator by
virtue of the Conventions.
But – subject to any constraints imposed by
international law – a national court may determine the
extent of its own jurisdiction in accordance with its own
national laws. This point is particularly relevant in relation
to courts operating outside the Brussels/Lugano
Convention areas. For example, a court sitting in the USA
might claim jurisdiction over torts allegedly committed by
the regulator of a foreign institution, on the basis that US
depositors had lost money and the tort thus had direct and
identifiable consequences in the United States (the
“effects” doctrine) – see, for example, Calder v Jones 465
US 783 (1984); Panavision International v Toeppen (US Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, 17 April 1998).
If sued in a foreign court, a regulator would also be
unable to claim the benefit of the domestic immunities
available to it within its home state, because (i) immunities
of this kind are of a procedural character and (ii) a foreign
court will apply its own domestic procedural rules – thus
ignoring the statutory immunity. This conflict of law
principle is generally recognised in most countries – see,
for example, Des Brisay v Goldfield Corporation 637 F2d 680
(1979), FDIC v Petersen 770 F2d 141 (1985) and
International Tin Council v Amalgamet Inc 524 NYS 2d 971
(1988). The same general principle is encapsulated in
Article 1(2)(h) of the Rome Convention on the Law
Applicable to Contractual Obligations.
State Immunity – United Kingdom
It follows from the points made above that a financial
market regulator must at all costs avoid becoming a defendant
to proceedings in a court outside its home state. This
attitude is motivated not merely by nationalistic sentiment;
it is necessary to preserve the procedural immunities
conferred upon the regulator by domestic law. The market
regulator would therefore be compelled to seek refuge in
another – and entirely separate – form of immunity.
State immunity is ultimately derived from
considerations of international law – all States are equal
and thus no state can subject another state to its
jurisdiction; see for example The Christina [1938] AC 485;
Rahimtoola v Nizam of Hyderabad [1958] AC 379. This
general form of state immunity is now encapsulated in the
domestic law of the United Kingdom – see section 1(1),
State Immunity Act 1978. But the international
recognition of the rule may be seen from an examination
of corresponding laws in foreign states, including: (i)
section 1604, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976
(USA); (ii) section 3(1), State Immunity Act 1985
(Canada); and (iii) section 9, Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act 1985 (Australia).
Generally speaking, state immunity can only be claimed
by the foreign state concerned, its government and its
Head of State. However, a separately incorporated entity
(eg a central bank or foreign entity similar to the Financial
Services Authority) is also entitled to immunity if:
• The actions which are the subject matter of the
proceedings involve the exercise of sovereign authority;
and
• The state itself would have been immune in
corresponding circumstances.
A financial regulator would normally meet these criteria.
There are a number of exceptions or cases in which
immunity will not apply, for example (i) in the case of
contracts of a commercial or financial character (s 3, State
Immunity Act 1978) and (ii) damage to tangible property,
where the damage results from an act or omission in the
United Kingdom (s 5, State Immunity Act 1978). A bank
deposit is not tangible property – rather, it is a chose in
action or property in an intangible form.
In essence, immunity is intended to cover acts of a
sovereign or governmental nature but does not extend to
acts of a commercial or private character (see the
exceptions noted above). It seems clear that the statutory
regulation of the national financial sector must be regarded
as a governmental (rather than private) function, and it
follows from the points noted above that a foreign
regulator would be immune from proceedings in the
United Kingdom in respect of losses resulting from a failed
bank under its supervision.
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